Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
I n a typical corporate inversion, a U.S.-domiciled parent corporation forms a new subsidiary in a tax haven country, and the haven-domiciled entity becomes the parent company of the fi rm's U.S. and foreign operations. Executives of inverting fi rms typically state that inversion will reduce the fi nancial statement effective tax rate (ETR) and improve earnings and cash fl ows.
1 While acknowledging the legality of inversion transactions, policymakers have questioned their ethics and patriotism. Senator Charles E. Grassley describes inversion as "immoral," and states that "during a war on terrorism, coming out of a recession, everyone ought to be pulling together. If companies don't have their hearts in America, they ought to get out" (Hamilton, 2002) . However, an Ernst & Young promotional video asserts that "just the improvement on earnings is powerful enough to say that maybe the patriotism issue needs to take a back seat to that" (Hamilton, 2002) . Managers suggest that the source of inversion-related tax savings will be the reduction or elimination of U.S. tax on foreign-source earnings. For example, at a May 14, 2002 special meeting of shareholders, Cooper Industries' CEO H. John Riley, Jr. stated:
Unlike our major trading partners, the United States taxes a business based on place of incorporation rather than source of the income. As a result, U.S. corporations are at a disadvantage when competing with foreign-based competitors… . While a foreign-based company would enjoy a 10% rate in Ireland, a U.S. company like Cooper is required to pay both the 10% tax rate in Ireland and, ultimately, an additional 25% tax to the United States. I'd say that's a clear competitive disadvantage. (Riley, 2002) Besides avoiding U.S. tax on foreignsource earnings, an inverted fi rm can also avoid U.S. tax on U.S.-source earnings by shifting, or stripping, U.S.-source earnings to lower-tax jurisdictions. 2 The consulting fi rm Baker & McKenzie, in a document highlighting the benefits of inversion and the fi rm's expertise, refers to such stripping as one of the objectives of an inversion transaction. The U.S. Treasury Department is concerned about such stripping and believes that avoidance of U.S. tax on U.S.-source earnings is the primary reason that fi rms invert (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2002, p. 21) . Although other methods of stripping U.S. earnings exist (e.g., royalty payments, management fees, and transfer pricing arrangements), both the U.S. Treasury and Baker & McKenzie place particular emphasis on stripping through the use of intercompany debt. 3 In congressional testimony regarding the Treasury's 2002 inversion report, Pamela Olson, Acting Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, described the avoidance of U.S. tax through earnings stripping via intercompany debt as "the real 'juice' in an inversion transaction" (Olson, 2002) .
She also asserts that existing IRC §163(j), which potentially limits the extent to which a foreign-domiciled fi rm can strip U.S. earnings through intercompany interest payments (by limiting the U.S. tax deduction for interest paid if U.S. operations are too highly leveraged), needs to be strengthened to help equalize the U.S. tax burdens of foreign-controlled U.S. companies, including inverted fi rms, and domestic-controlled U.S. companies.
Our sample consists of 12 inversion fi rms and 24 matched control fi rms. The effective date of the last inversion included in our sample is June 26, 2002, suggesting that pending anti-inversion legislation with retroactive application dates (e.g., S. 1637), or increased public scrutiny of inversion, has at least temporarily halted the types of inversions examined in this study. We use fi nancial statement data over pre-and post-inversion periods to (i) examine whether inversion reduces ETRs, (ii) analyze the role of earnings stripping in observed ETR reductions, (iii) quantify the tax reduction and earnings improvement derived from earnings stripping, and (iv) re-examine the valuation consequences of inversion. Consistent with the claims of inverted fi rms' executives, we fi nd that inversion generally results in large ETR reductions. Specifi cally, for the inversion sample, the mean post-inversion ETR is 20.44 percent; in comparison, the mean pre-inversion ETR is 32.01 percent. The 11.57 percentage point reduction in mean ETR for the inversion sample is significantly greater than the mean ETR reduction for the control sample (approximately four percentage points). 2 The incentive to strip U.S. earnings is not limited to inverted U.S. fi rms. Foreign-domiciled companies (whose foreign domicile was not established via an inversion) with tax rates less than the U.S. rate have similar incentives to strip U.S. earnings. U.S.-domiciled fi rms also have incentives to strip U.S. earnings. However, their ability to do so is severely limited by statutory interest expense allocation rules. Further, as discussed in Desai and Hines (2002) , an inverted structure increases the returns to stripping. U.S.-domiciled fi rms achieve only deferral of income when U.S. earnings are stripped; foreign-domiciled fi rms (including inverted fi rms) achieve permanent exclusion of income stripped from the U.S. 3 Hufbauer and Assa (2003, p. 5) state that earnings stripping "occurs when an excessive portion of the corporate earnings of a U.S. subsidiary is paid out as interest to the foreign parent corporation (or one of its foreign subsidiaries) and claimed as a deduction against the corporate income of the U.S. subsidiary."
Despite managements' claims that inversion-related tax savings will be due to the avoidance of U.S. tax on foreign earnings, we conclude, based on changes in the percentage of pre-tax income derived from foreign sources (i.e., foreign income shares) and changes in foreign and U.S. pre-tax profi t margin percentages, that most of the tax savings is attributable to the avoidance of U.S. tax on U.S. earnings. For the inversion sample, we fi nd that the mean foreign income share increases substantially across pre-and post-inversion periods (from 49 to 81 percent), and that the increase signifi cantly exceeds that for the control sample (from 29 to 39 percent). This large increase in foreign income shares could be due to increased foreign revenue shares and/or improvement (deterioration) in "real" foreign (U.S.) pre-tax profi t margin percentages. However, we observe only a modest pre-to post-inversion period increase in the percentage of total revenue derived from foreign sources (37 to 43 percent); hence, it seems unlikely that the large increase in foreign income shares for the inversion sample is due to increased foreign revenue shares. On the other hand, we fi nd that the inversion sample's mean foreign pre-tax profi t margin percentage nearly doubles in post-inversion periods (from 11 to 21 percent), while the mean U.S. pre-tax profi t margin percentage declines from nine percent in the pre-inversion period to -6.5 percent in the post-inversion period. Since both profi t margin changes are signifi cantly different from analogous control sample changes, it is unlikely that the inversion sample's changes are entirely due to economic factors (i.e., changes in "real" profi tability). When viewed in combination, these pre-to post-inversion period changes are consistent with inverted fi rms stripping U.S. earnings to foreign jurisdictions.
We bolster this full-sample evidence of earnings stripping, and provide insight into the stripping mechanism, by exploiting consolidating financial statement schedules of four fi rms that completed inversions in 2002. 4 These schedules, required by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations when the foreign parent company guarantees debt of the former (U.S.-domiciled) parent company, indicate that U.S.-based intercompany debt and related interest expense for the four fi rms increased dramatically following their inversions. Specifi cally, in two post-inversion years (2002 and 2003) , these four companies reported a combined total of approximately two billion dollars of U.S.-based intercompany interest expense and fees, a substantial increase over the combined total of $300 million reported in two pre-inversion years (2000 and 2001) . The U.S.-based intercompany interest expense and fees facilitate the shifting of (otherwise) U.S. taxable income to foreign jurisdictions, and we fi nd little evidence that IRC §163(j) restricts such shifting for the four fi rms. Assuming that two billion dollars of such income is shifted to foreign jurisdictions imposing the fi rms' average foreign tax rates, the four fi rms' aggregate, two-year tax savings is approximately $520 million, and the estimated revenue loss to the U.S. Treasury is approximately $700 million (which represents 0.17 percent of the total corporate tax revenue collected by the U.S. Treasury in fi scal 2002 and 2003) . 5 Based on additional analysis of the four fi rms, we attribute most of their realized ETR reductions to earnings strip- ping through intercompany debt, and estimate that these stripping-derived ETR reductions increased their reported net income approximately 30 percent (on average), relative to the net income that would have been reported in the absence of stripping. Our study is related to prior research examining the taxpaying status of foreign-controlled domestic corporations (FCDCs), since inversion transforms a U.S.-domiciled multinational fi rm into a FCDC (albeit through the use of a unique transaction that entails no underlying ownership, managerial or operational changes). Grubert, Goodspeed, and Swenson (1993) and Grubert (1999) document that FCDCs report lower levels of taxable income than U.S.-controlled domestic corporations, and conjecture that some of the difference could be due to income manipulation. Collins, Kemsley, and Shackelford (1997) and Kinney and Lawrence (2000) provide no evidence of such manipulation. However, Mills and Newberry (2004) provide evidence consistent with FCDCs' parent companies utilizing tax-motivated income reporting and debt location strategies. The authors report a significant relation between foreign multinational fi rms' U.S. taxable income and their average foreign tax rates, and fi nd that FCDCs' debt levels are inversely related to their parents' average foreign tax rates. Consistent with the fi ndings of Mills and Newberry (2004) , our study provides evidence that U.S. companies that became FCDCs via inversion do manipulate income, and suggests that intercompany debt is used to facilitate the earnings stripping.
We also extend prior research that has produced inconsistent results regarding the price reaction to inversion announcements (Desai and Hines, 2002; Seida and Wempe, 2002; and Cloyd, Mills, and Weaver, 2003b) . We include ex post inversion-related ETR changes (a proxy for investors' ex ante beliefs regarding the tax benefi ts of inversion) as an independent variable in a regression model that analyzes inversion announcement period price reactions. We fi nd no evidence that variation in the price reaction to board approval of inversion is explained by realized ETR changes. However, we fi nd a strong association between realized ETR changes and price reactions to shareholder approval of inversion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background information on corporate inversions and prior inversion-related research. The third section describes our sample. The fourth section presents our full sample analyses. The fi fth section presents earnings stripping analyses using information from four fi rms' consolidating fi nancial statement schedules. The sixth section examines the association between price reactions to inversion announcements and ex post ETR changes. The fi nal section summarizes and concludes.
BACKGROUND
An inverted corporate structure is one in which a U.S.-domiciled parent company becomes a subsidiary of a newly-formed, haven-domiciled parent company. Typically, shares of the former parent company are converted to shares of the new, haven-domiciled parent in a transaction that is taxable to shareholders, the former U.S. parent, or both (for explanations of transaction structures, see Lemein and McDonald (2002) or Thompson (2002) ). The physical location of corporate facilities does not change, and virtually no operational changes accompany the inversion.
The primary benefi ts of inversion are potential reductions in corporate income taxes and fi nancial statement ETRs. By establishing domicile in a foreign country, an inverted fi rm's foreign earnings are no longer subject to U.S. taxation. Executives of inverting fi rms often tout such avoidance as the source of inversion-related tax savings, and proxy materials for inversion transactions routinely note that foreign competitors have lower tax burdens because their non-U.S. earnings are not subject to U.S. taxation. Hence, among inverting fi rms and their executives, the publicly-stated rationale for inversion is that the worldwide tax system applied to U.S.-domiciled fi rms places them at a competitive disadvantage relative to foreign-domiciled fi rms, many of which are located in territorial tax systems. 6 Another potential source of inversion-related tax savings is the avoidance of U.S. tax on U.S. earnings, which can result when intercompany transactions are structured so that a fi rm's U.S.-based operations (i.e., the former U.S.-domiciled parent, which is now a subsidiary of the foreign parent) incur significant intercompany expenses. This practice, known as earnings stripping, can be achieved in a variety of ways, such as allocating U.S. subsidiaries intercompany debt, requiring them to pay foreign affi liates for the use of intangible assets, or through transfer pricing. The Department of the Treasury (2002) describes tax savings arising from earnings stripping as more quantifi able than savings arising from the elimination of U.S. tax on foreign earnings, and suggests that stripping-derived tax savings are a fi rst-order consideration for fi rms contemplating inversion. The consulting fi rm Baker & McKenzie touts such tax savings as a signifi cant benefi t of an inversion transaction. Corporate executives, however, do not publicly acknowledge that U.S. earnings stripping is an anticipated source of tax savings. Desai and Hines (2002) and Cloyd et al. (2003b) examine inversions, but provide limited evidence regarding earnings stripping. Desai and Hines (2002) analyze the price reaction to The Stanley Work's (Stanley's) proposed inversion. Based on the reaction to Stanley's inversion-related events, Desai and Hines (2002) estimate the present value of the company's inversion to be at least $250 million, despite the fact that the present value of Stanley's avoidance of U.S. tax on foreign-source income (under an inverted structure) is estimated to be no more than $83 million. Desai and Hines (2002) conclude that this substantial difference in valuation arose because the market anticipated that Stanley, under an inverted structure, would have significantly reduced U.S. taxes through earnings stripping. Desai and Hines (2002) and Cloyd et al. (2003b) examine the characteristics of inversion fi rms relative to control fi rms. 8 Desai and Hines (2002) fi nd that inversion fi rms tend to be larger and more leveraged than control fi rms, and also report a higher percentage of foreign assets. Cloyd et al. (2003b) also fi nd that inversion fi rms are generally larger than control fi rms, but fi nd no signifi cant difference in leverage. Finally, Cloyd et al. (2003b) conclude that inversion fi rms have signifi cantly higher tax rates in the year prior to the inversion announcement. 6 Firms can avoid U.S. tax on foreign earnings by retaining the earnings in the country of origin, and can avoid recording a (GAAP) provision for U.S. taxes by classifying the earnings as permanently reinvested. However, Avi-Yonah (2002) notes that U.S. fi rms still have strong incentives to invert in order to avoid U.S. tax on U.S.-source income, and to avoid application of Subpart F (which results in current U.S. taxation of foreign passive income). 7 Stanley ultimately withdrew its inversion proposal in response to intense political and media pressure. Desai and Hines (2002) note that the level of debt necessary for Stanley to strip enough U.S. income to justify the market's higher valuation of the company would not have been restricted by the thin capitalization rules under IRC §163(j). 8 Cloyd et al. (2003b) compare inversion fi rms to non-inverted industry (two-digit SIC) counterparts. Desai and Hines (2002) initially consider all fi rms with available Compustat and CRSP data as potential control fi rms, but then screen fi rms on the basis of continuous provision of export data from 1992 to 1998. Desai and Hines (2002) , Seida and Wempe (2002) , and Cloyd et al. (2003b) examine the valuation effects of corporate inversions. Desai and Hines (2002) report that stock price reactions to board of directors approving inversions are, on average, positive, (1.7 percent mean abnormal return weighted by market capitalization), but provide no evidence that the result is statistically signifi cant (ten of 19 sample fi rms have positive abnormal returns). In regression analyses, Desai and Hines (2002) fi nd that abnormal returns at board approval dates are signifi cantly associated with inverters' past stock price changes and leverage levels, but are not associated with other variables expected to affect the fi nancial benefi ts of inversion (average foreign tax rates, foreign pre-tax income share, and foreign asset share). 9 On the other hand, Cloyd et al. (2003b) fi nd no evidence that stock prices increased at the time boards of directors approved inversions. Seida and Wempe (2002) find results similar to Cloyd et al. (2003b) regarding board approval, but report evidence of a positive market reaction to subsequent shareholder approval of inversion. In addition, Seida and Wempe (2002) note that market reactions at shareholder approval of post-Autumn 2001 inversions were signifi cantly smaller than those for pre-Autumn 2001 inversions.
10

SAMPLE SELECTION
Inversion Firms
We searched SEC fi lings (10K and 8K) on Lexis/Nexis for firms reporting a domicile in one of 41 countries identifi ed as tax havens in the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2000 Progress Report. We identifi ed 97 such fi rms for which at least one year of data are available on Compustat. The indicated tax haven appeared to be 68 firms' initial domicile (i.e., there appeared to be no possibility of an inversion transaction). In addition, fi ve fi rms were re-domiciling to a tax haven from a country other than the United States, and one fi rm was privately held for many years preceding and following its inversion. Of the remaining 28 fi rms, we (i) eliminated nine companies for which the inversion transaction was confounded by a contemporaneous event (e.g., a spin-off), (ii) eliminated one fi rm (Stanley) that withdrew its inversion proposal subsequent to board and shareholder approval, and (iii) eliminated six insurance fi rms, thereby restricting the sample to fi rms that consistently disclose the geographic sources of pre-tax income. Table  1 lists the 12 remaining inversion fi rms' names, board and shareholder approval dates, effective dates, and four-digit SIC classifi cations.
11
9 Past stock price appreciation is a proxy for capital gains taxes imposed on shareholders as a result of inversion. The underlying rationale is that the market construes the magnitude of capital gains tax imposed on existing shareholders as evidence regarding the corporate-level benefi ts arising from the transaction (i.e., the market anticipates that the capital gains tax burden and corporate-level inversion benefi ts are positively correlated). 10 In a New York Times article (Johnston, 2002) , a Lehman Brothers tax expert provides a rationale for postAutumn 2001 inversions having smaller valuation effects, and for the dearth of post-Autumn 2001 inversions: "Any company with a decent amount of foreign income will see its tax rate fall dramatically (if it inverts). But the political considerations sometimes prevail, and companies are understandably reluctant to do something like this because it will not necessarily be properly construed in the marketplace. It may be seen as not patriotic and in the wake of September 11, that is not a good posture for a company." The tax expert cites personal knowledge of several companies that declined inversion proposals for the reason noted. 11 All 12 fi rms are included in the samples analyzed by Desai and Hines (2002) , Cloyd, et al. (2003b) , and Seida and Wempe (2002) .
Control Firms
For each inversion fi rm, we identifi ed two non-inverted U.S.-based competitors to serve as control fi rms. We defi ned an inversion fi rm's "measurement year" as the year prior to board approval of its inversion, and then determined whether an acceptable control fi rm was available from a list of the inversion fi rm's three key competitors in the Hoover's Company Capsule Database. For the majority of the inversion fi rms, we used the key competitor with measurement year sales closest in amount to that of the inversion fi rm (and with required data available on Compustat and CRSP) as the fi rst control fi rm. For the inversion fi rms for which no match was available from Hoover's Capsules, we examined the broader list of competitors in the Hoover's Company Profi le Database, and selected the competitor with measurement year sales closest to that of the inversion fi rm (and with required data available) as the fi rst control fi rm. For the remaining unmatched inversion fi rms, the fi rm on Compustat in the same four-digit SIC class and with measurement year sales closest in amount to the inversion fi rm's measurement year sales was chosen as the fi rst control fi rm. We then repeated the entire process to select a second control fi rm for each inversion fi rm. Hence, our fi nal sample consists of 36 fi rms (12 inversion fi rms, each matched with two control fi rms). For the 36 fi rms included in the sample, the median market value of equity (total assets) at the time of board approval of inversion is $2.7 billion (three billion dollars), and between-sample size differences are insignifi cant.
FULL SAMPLE ANALYSIS
In this section, we use the full sample of 12 inversion fi rms and 24 control fi rms to examine whether inversion reduces fi rms' ETRs. We also use certain fi nancial statement ratios, including foreign income shares, in an attempt to determine whether avoidance of U.S. tax on U.S. earnings contributes to any inversion-related ETR reduction. In conducting the analyses, we defi ne the "pre-inversion" period as the three years preceding an inversion's effective year, and the "post-inversion" period as the inversion's effective year plus the two following years (only two years of data are available in the post-inversion period for the 2002 inversions). In all analyses, control fi rms are aligned in event time with their respective inversion fi rms. In addition to tests of the inversion sample itself, we conduct between-sample tests to control for economic effects common to both samples. Our ETR measure is based on the total income tax expense reported for fi nancial accounting purposes.
12 In general, it is computed as total income tax expense over the pre-or post-inversion period divided by total pre-tax income over the same period. To the extent that a specifi c disclosure is made about a non-recurring item that affects reported tax expense, we adjust the reported tax expense accordingly.
13 Table 2 presents the mean values of the ETR measure during the pre-and post-inversion periods, as well the mean across-period change in ETR (post-inversion minus pre-inversion) for both the inversion and control samples. The last three columns of Table  2 (labeled Difference) provide mean between-sample differences in ETRs in the pre-and post-inversion periods, as well as the mean between-sample difference in changes in ETRs.
Consistent with the stated expectations of inversion fi rms' executives, we fi nd that the mean ETR for the inversion sample declined 11.57 percentage points in the post-inversion period (32.01 percent preinversion; 20.44 percent post-inversion), and that the decline is signifi cant at p = 0.005 in a t-test.
14 The mean ETR for the control fi rm sample also declines across the pre-and post-inversion periods (3.98 percentage point decline), although much less than that in the inversion fi rm sample. Finally, the Difference column in Table 2 produces three inferences: (i) no significant difference in pre-inversion ETRs exists for inversion and control fi rms (p = 0.532, two-tailed test); (ii) inversion fi rms have lower post-inversion ETRs than control fi rms (p = 0.020, one-tailed test); and (iii) inversion fi rms, compared to control fi rms, experience larger ETR reductions in post-inversion periods (-7.59 between sample difference, p = 0.044 in a one-tailed t-test).
We use the remaining measures reported in Table 2 to assess whether inversion-related ETR reductions are due to avoiding U.S. tax on U.S. earnings. We fi rst examine the percentage of total pre-tax income that is foreign-source (hereafter foreign income share), computed as the sum of foreign pre-tax income in the pre-or post-inversion period, divided by the sum of total pre-tax income during the same period. During the pre-inversion period, the mean foreign income share is substantially higher for inversion fi rms (49.40 percent) than for control fi rms (29.30 percent), but the difference is not statistically signifi cant (p = 0.118, two-tailed test). For the inversion sample, the mean foreign income share increases 31.79 percentage points (p = 0.006, one-tailed test), to 81.19 percent in the post-inversion period. The control fi rms also exhibit a statistically sig-12 Our measure of tax burden is consistent with prior research (Givoly and Hayn, 1992; Amir et al., 2001) and with the view under GAAP that in calculating a given year's earnings, the deferred portion of total income tax is a bona fi de expense, despite the fact that it is not payable currently (i.e., total tax expense refl ects the expected total tax burden on reported pre-tax book income, irrespective of the timing of the underlying tax payments). In addition, our ETR variable, compared to a variable that uses current taxes in the numerator, is a less noisy measure for capturing permanent rate differences generated by earnings stripping. 13 We calculate tax rates in the manner described, rather than averaging annual tax rates, to effectively weight annual tax rates by the magnitude of annual pre-tax income levels; however, inferences are unchanged when annual rates are averaged. Reported tax expense was adjusted for Ingersoll-Rand due to one-time inversion-related tax benefi ts recorded in 2001, and for Cooper Industries and Weatherford International due to tax settlements for years prior to the pre-inversion period. Firms for which the total tax provision was materially positive over a pre-or post-inversion period, but for which pre-tax income was negative over the period, were coded as having tax rates of 0.5. Further, we bound tax rates at 0 and 0.5 for all sample fi rms. 14 Except as otherwise noted, analyses of median ETRs, and of median changes in ETRs, produce results similar to those reported, and non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests and Wilcoxon tests) produce similar inferences.
nifi cant increase in mean foreign income share (9.76 percentage points, p = 0.052 in a two-tailed test). However, the Difference columns provide two results that are consistent with earnings stripping on the part of inverted fi rms. First, we fi nd that inverted fi rms' mean foreign income share exceeds that of control firms by 42.13 percentage points in the post-inversion period (p = 0.001, one-tailed test). In addition, we fi nd that the mean increase in inverted fi rms' foreign income shares exceeds the analogous increase for control fi rms by 22.03 percentage points (p = 0.035, one-tailed test). The observed changes in the location of pre-tax income suggest that inverted fi rms' ETR reductions may be due to the stripping of U.S. income to foreign jurisdictions. However, an alternative explanation is that inverted fi rms' increases in foreign income shares are due to underlying changes in geographic Note: Change is computed as Post minus Pre. Effective tax rate is the total tax provision divided by total pre-tax income. Foreign income share is foreign-source pre-tax income divided by total pre-tax income. Foreign revenue share is foreign-source revenue divided by total revenue. Foreign (U.S.) profi t margin is foreign-source (U.S.-source) pre-tax income divided by foreign-source (U.S.-source) revenue. The pre-inversion period is the three-year period prior to the inversion effective year. The post-inversion period is the inversion effective year plus the two following years, using whatever data are available. The baseline sample is the sample of 12 (24) inversion (control) fi rms. In tests of foreign pre-tax income shares, Transocean and matches are removed because the sources of Transocean's post-inversion pre-tax income are not disclosed. Transocean and matches are removed in tests of foreign and U.S. pre-tax margins for the same reason. In addition, 1) XOMA and matches are removed because for all three fi rms, all income is U.S.-source (hence any changes in U.S. margins are unrelated to income shifting); 2) Triton and matches are removed because Triton reports no U.S.-source revenue in the post-inversion period; and 3) Helen of Troy and matches are removed because Helen of Troy reports virtually no foreign-source sales (i.e., the company reports substantial foreign-source pre-tax income, but all foreign sales are intercompany). Finally, one control fi rm is removed in the test of foreign pre-tax margins because all of the fi rm's income is U.S.-source. Overall, tests of ETRs and foreign revenue shares are conducted with n = 12 (n = 24) inversion (control) fi rms. After the noted sample attrition, tests of foreign income shares include n = 11 (n = 22) inversion (control) fi rms; tests of foreign profi t margins include n = 8 (n = 15) inversion (control) fi rms; and tests of U.S. profi t margins include n = 8 (n = 16) inversion (control) fi rms. In within-sample tests, signifi cance levels for the inversion (control) sample are from one-tailed (two-tailed) t-tests. Except for tests of pre-inversion differences, between-sample tests are one-tailed. revenue sources. To evaluate this possibility, we examine pre-to post-inversion changes in the percentage of total revenue attributable to foreign sources (hereafter foreign revenue shares). We then examine pre-to post-inversion changes in U.S. and foreign profi t margins to discern whether any profi t margin changes are consistent with an earnings stripping hypothesis. We collected data regarding the geographic sources of total revenue from the footnotes of our sample fi rms' annual reports or 10-K fi lings. We compute foreign revenue share by dividing total foreign revenue in the pre-or post-inversion period by total revenue during the same period. In the pre-inversion period, inversion (control) fi rms derived, on average, 36.81 percent (31.12 percent) of total revenue from foreign sources (see Table 2 ). As indicated in the Difference column of Table 2 , the 5.69 percentage point between-sample difference in the pre-inversion period is not signifi cant (p = 0.536, two-tailed test). For the inversion sample, the mean foreign revenue share increases to 43.23 percent in the post-inversion period, and the 6.42 percentage point increase is highly signifi cant (p = 0.009, one-tailed test). For the control sample, mean foreign revenue share increased by 2.52 percentage points, which is marginally signifi cant (p = 0.097, two-tailed test). Two results from the Difference column provide evidence consistent with post-inversion U.S. earnings stripping among inversion fi rms. First, we fi nd no signifi cant between-sample difference in the percentage of post-inversion revenue derived from foreign sources (p = 0.162, one-tailed test). In addition, we fi nd only marginally signifi cant evidence of a between-sample difference in the change in foreign revenue shares (3.90 percentage point difference, p = 0.074 in a one-tailed test). Although the directions of these differences are consistent with fi rms inverting in anticipation of an increase in foreign sales activity (and an increase in "real" foreign profi tability), the magnitude of these differences suggest that changes in foreign revenue shares likely do not explain the large changes in foreign income shares.
Next, we examine foreign and U.S. pretax profi t margins.
15 Foreign (U.S.) pre-tax profi t margin is defi ned as the sum of reported pre-tax foreign (U.S.) profi t in the pre-or post-inversion period, divided by the sum of reported foreign (U.S.) sales in the same period. We fi nd no signifi cant difference between the inversion and control samples for either profi t margin measure in the pre-inversion period (see the Difference column). However, for the inversion sample, we fi nd changes in both profi t margin measures that are consistent with earnings stripping. As indicated in Table  2 , inversion fi rms' mean foreign pre-tax profi t margin increased from 10.81 percent in the pre-inversion period to 21.03 percent in the post-inversion period; the 10.22 percentage point change is signifi cant at p = 0.006 in a one-tailed test. Conversely, we observe marked deterioration in inversion fi rms' U.S. pre-tax profi t margins-from 9.09 percent in the pre-inversion period to -6.57 percent in the post-inversion period. The -15.66 percentage point change is signifi cant at p < 0.001 in a one-tailed test.
These changes differ signifi cantly from the analogous changes observed for control fi rms. In the case of foreign pre-tax margin, inversion fi rms' improvement exceeds control fi rms' changes by 10.43 percentage points (p = 0.005, one-tailed test). Further, the deterioration of inversion fi rms' U.S. pre-tax margins exceeds that of control fi rms by 8.27 percentage points (p = 0.048, one-tailed test). These tests included one control sample fi rm (Pride International) reporting a very unusual post-inversion U.S. pre-tax profit margin percentage (-61 percent). With Pride International removed the statistical signifi cance of the between-sample differences in post-inversion U.S. pre-tax profi t margins and pre-to post-inversion changes in profi t margins increase substantially.
On balance, it seems unlikely that inversion fi rms' large increases in foreign pre-tax profi t margins, and simultaneous decreases in U.S. pre-tax profi t margins, are substantially explained by changes in underlying "real" profi tability. Given that these substantial changes are observed across an event (i.e., inversion) that increased the returns to earnings stripping, it seems likely that inversion fi rms used intercompany transactions to strip U.S. earnings to foreign jurisdictions. Hence, we conjecture that the large post-inversion ETR reductions reported in Table  2 are likely attributable to fi rms using inverted corporate structures to avoid U.S. tax on U.S. earnings. These results affi rm Treasury Department concerns that inversion fi rms may become more aggressive in shifting taxable income from the U.S. to lower-tax foreign jurisdictions.
ANALYSIS OF FOUR FIRMS' CONSOLIDATING SCHEDULE DATA
In this section we exploit data from consolidating schedules required under Section 3-10 of SEC Regulation S-X (issued in 2000) to more defi nitively determine whether observed inversion-related ETR reductions are attributable to earnings stripping. Of the 12 inversion fi rms examined in this study, seven provide such information in footnote disclosures. We examine four of these firms: Cooper Industries, Ingersoll-Rand, Nabors Industries, and Noble Drilling. Table 3 summarizes information from the four fi rms' consolidating schedules regarding intercompany debt and related interest expense, and the amount of such debt and interest expense defi nitively attributable to U.S. subsidiaries. 16 The three other fi rms that provide consolidating schedules (Foster Wheeler, Tyco International, and Weatherford International) are not included in this analysis. Tyco and Weatherford are omitted because neither fi rm provides consolidating schedules for pre-inversion years. Foster Wheeler is omitted because recent fi nancial distress experienced by the company renders certain fi nancial data diffi cult to interpret (Foster Wheeler's pre-tax income is negative in four of the fi ve years between 1999 and 2003, and the company has received a going concern opinion since 2001).
17
The inversions for these four firms were effective in 2002 (Ingersoll-Rand's inversion was actually effective December 31, 2001, but income consequences, aside from one-time benefi ts recorded in 2001, 16 We deem debt located with the fi rms' former U.S.-based parent companies as defi nitively U.S.-based. However, it seems likely that a substantial portion of debt located with "other subsidiaries" is also U.S. were not realized until 2002). As indicated in Table 3 , all four fi rms exhibit sizable increases in both total and long-term intercompany debt subsequent to inverting. 3,135.0 Note: Data for intercompany debt and intercompany interest expense and fees are taken from the fi rms' condensed consolidating fi nancial statements, which are included in the footnotes to the fi nancial statements. The disclosures are required under Section 3-10 of SEC Regulation S-X when a subsidiary issues securities guaranteed by its parent. long-term intercompany debt increased by $2,336.9 million, $3,647.4 million, $2,236.4 million, and $573.9 million, respectively, for the four fi rms. 18 Consistent with large increases in intercompany debt, Table 3 The consolidating schedules for three of the fi rms allow a portion of intercompany debt and interest and fee expense to be defi nitively attributed to the fi rms' pre-inversion U.S.-based parents (now subsidiaries of the newly-formed parents). In the cases of Cooper, Ingersoll-Rand, and Noble, most of the noted increase in long-term intercompany debt and intercompany interest expense and fees is defi nitively attributable to U.S.-based entities and may, therefore, shift U.S. earnings to foreign jurisdictions. Before estimating the potential tax savings and financial statement effects implied by these intercompany expenses, we conduct tests on the same ratios examined in the full sample analysis.
The fi rst part of Panel A in Table 4 shows seven fi nancial statement variables (denoted A through G) that are used to compute the ratios we examine. The amounts for each fi rm refl ect annual averages over a three-year pre-inversion period (1999, 2000, and 2001 ) and a two-year post-inversion period (2002 and 2003) , and the across-period change (post minus pre). Based on the pre-and post-inversion period amounts, the bottom half of Panel A shows the fi ve ratios examined in the full sample analysis. For Cooper, Ingersoll-Rand, Nabors, and Noble, we fi nd pre-to post-inversion ETR reductions of 12.84, 23.60, 36.74, and 12.58 percentage points, respectively. Likewise, foreign income shares increase by 52.89, 74.64, 73.45, and 47.89 percentage points, respectively. The average annual total revenue is higher in the post-inversion period for each fi rm except for Cooper, which experiences a $168.5 million decline (approximately a four percent decline). The increase in total revenue is attributable to foreign revenue increases since, for each fi rm, foreign-source revenue increases while U.S.-source revenue decreases. These changes manifest themselves in the foreign revenue share variable. Both Cooper and Ingersoll-Rand report only modest increases in foreign revenue shares across the pre-and post-inversion periods (2.36 and 6.03 percentage point increases, respectively), while Nabors and Noble have more substantial increases (15.93 and 17.59 percentage points, respectively). All four of these changes in foreign revenue shares are considerably smaller than the changes in foreign income shares noted above. Finally, each of the four fi rms re-18 Ingersoll-Rand's (IR's) October 30, 2001 registration statement (p. 17) describes a transaction, executed in conjunction with its inversion, in which "IR-New Jersey and certain of its subsidiaries will transfer shares of certain existing subsidiaries of IR-New Jersey (the "Transferred Assets") and issue certain debt (the "Debt") to IR-Limited in exchange for which IR-Limited will issue that number of IR-Limited Class B common shares that has an aggregate value equal to the fair market value of the Transferred Assets and the amount of the Debt." Footnotes 13 and 20 of IR-Limited's 2002 annual report indicate that the note and shares of certain IR-New Jersey subsidiaries were exchanged for 135.3 million shares of IR-Limited class B shares, and that the note, due in 2011, has a fi xed rate of interest of 11 percent per annum payable semi-annually. The amount of the note was $3,647 million. The business purpose of the subsidiaries' receipt of class B shares of IR-Limited is unclear. The class B shares are non-voting shares, but are entitled to dividends equivalent to those paid on class A shares (although IR entities entitled to receive dividends on class B shares declined the dividend). indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10 in two-sample t-tests. Except for pre-inversion differences, the betweensample tests are one-tailed. Signifi cance levels are similar using the nonparametric Wilcoxon test (except the difference in the U.S. pre-tax profi t margin in the post-inversion period is signifi cant at p < 0.074).
ports a substantial pre-to post-inversion increase (decrease) in its foreign (U.S.) pre-tax profi t margin percentage. Table 4 , Panel B, provides a comparison of the changes in the means of the four inverted fi rms' computed variables to analogous changes for their eight matched control fi rms. In general, the inferences from this analysis are similar to those from the full-sample analysis. The mean ETR of the four inversion fi rms (eight control fi rms) declines from 32.93 percent (34.49 percent) in the pre-inversion period to 11.49 percent (33.07 percent) in the post-inversion period. From the last three columns of Table 4 , Panel B, we note that (i) pre-inversion ETRs do not differ signifi cantly between inversion and control fi rms, (ii) inversion fi rms' mean post-inversion ETR is 21.58 percentage points lower than control fi rms' mean post-inversion ETR (with the difference signifi cant at p < 0.001), and (iii) the pre-to post-inversion reduction in ETR for inversion fi rms exceeds that of control fi rms by 20.02 percentage points (p = 0.002).
The four inversion fi rms have a significantly larger increase in foreign income shares (53.16 percentage point betweensample difference, p < 0.001) and foreign revenue shares (8.94 percentage point difference, p = 0.018), and a shift toward higher margins on foreign-source revenue (11.93 percentage point between-sample difference in the change in foreign pre-tax margin, p = 0.007). Consistent with the increased foreign profitability in the post-inversion period being due to earnings stripping, we find that inversion fi rms' U.S. pre-tax profi t margin percentages decline in the post-inversion period. However, since the mean U.S. pre-tax profi t margin for the eight control fi rms also declines, none of the reported between-sample tests of U.S. pre-tax profi t margin is signifi cant. However, as in the full sample analyses, the control fi rms' reported means are highly infl uenced by Pride International's large negative U.S. pre-tax profi t margin percentage in the post-inversion period. Excluding Pride International, the control fi rms' pre-and post-inversion mean U.S. pre-tax profi t margins are 15.80 percent and 6.88 percent, respectively, and the post-inversion difference between the four inversion fi rms and the remaining control fi rms is signifi cant in both a t-test (p = 0.0129) and a Wilcoxon signed rank test (p = 0.024). The between-sample difference in changes in U.S. profi t margin percentages is not signifi cant in a t-test (p = 0.117) but is marginally signifi cant in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p = 0.078). In summary, the pre-to post-inversion period changes in foreign income shares and profi t margin percentages for the inversion fi rms are consistent with ETR reductions arising from earnings stripping.
The intercompany interest and fees reported in Table 3 allow the shifting of (otherwise) U.S. taxable income to foreign jurisdictions, and likely contribute substantially to the four fi rms' realized ETR reductions reported in Table 4 . We use the intercompany interest expense and fees amounts reported in Table 3 to estimate the potential tax savings, ETR reductions, and earnings changes attributable to earnings stripping for the two post-inversion years (i.e., 2002 and 2003) . Table 5 presents these estimates, and underlying data, for the four inversion fi rms. The reported dollar amounts for each fi rm refl ect the sum of the reported amounts for 2002 and 2003, and the average foreign tax rate is computed by combining both years. Our estimate of the U.S. tax savings from stripping assumes that U.S. income is subject to the 35 percent U.S. statutory tax rate (thus, we ignore state income tax consequences), and that the stripped income is subject to foreign income taxes at the fi rms' average foreign tax rates (although it seems likely that income is stripped to jurisdictions imposing tax rates less than the fi rms' average foreign tax rates). The fi rm-specifi c estimated stripping-related U.S. tax savings over the post-inversion period is computed by multiplying the total intercompany interest expense and fees reported for 2002 and 2003 by the difference between 35 percent and the average foreign tax rate. The estimated two-year tax savings varies from a low of $20.4 million for Noble to a high of $214.2 million for Ingersoll-Rand. The total estimated stripping-related U.S. tax savings for the four fi rms is $519.6 million. Assuming these earnings would have been subject to U.S. taxation, the estimated potential revenue loss to the U.S. Treasury is $713 million [$2,037.2 million*.35].
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Based on the estimated stripping-related tax savings, we compute strippingadjusted tax expense amounts by adding the reported tax expense amounts to the stripping-related tax savings amounts. We then use these adjusted tax expense amounts to compute stripping-adjusted ETRs. For comparison, Table 5 also includes the as reported ETRs. The stripping-adjusted ETRs are 48.46, 30.57, 38.59, and 17.38 percent for Cooper, IngersollRand, Nabors, and Noble, respectively. In comparison, the as reported post-inversion ETRs are 22.13, 10.65, 0.54, and 12.64 percent. We assess the extent to which the documented ETR reduction across the pre-and post-inversion periods (see Table 4 ) is due to stripping by comparing the stripping-adjusted post-inversion ETRs to the pre-inversion period ETRs. For both Cooper and Nabors, their stripping-adjusted ETRs exceed their pre-inversion period ETRs (i.e., 48.46 percent vs. 34.97 percent and 38.59 percent vs. 37.27 percent, respectively); thus, we conclude that their entire pre-to-post period ETR reductions are due to earnings stripping. Based on Ingersoll-Rand's stripping-adjusted ETR of 30.57 percent, it appears that, in the absence of earnings stripping via intercompany interest and fees, the company's ETR would have declined by 3.67 percentage points (computed as 34.24 percent pre-inversion ETR less 30.57 percent stripping-adjusted ETR), compared to the 23.60 percentage point decline reported in Table 4 . Thus, we estimate that 84 percent [(23.60 -3 .67)/23.60] of Ingersoll-Rand's total ETR reduction is derived from earnings stripping. Based on similar analyses, we estimate that 38 percent of Noble's ETR reduction is due to earnings stripping [(12.59 -7 .85)/12.59].
The last line of Table 5 estimates the percentage increase in post-inversion period net after-tax income (from continuing operations) due to the earnings-stripping related tax savings. The stripping-adjusted net income is computed as reported net income minus the estimated stripping-related U.S. tax savings. Across the four inversion fi rms, the total mean percentage increase in net income from stripping is 32.10 percent (see Total column). The specifi c percentage increases for each fi rm are 51.08, 28.69, 61.95, and 5.74 percent for Cooper, Ingersoll-Rand, Nabors, and Noble, respectively.
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IRC Section 163(j) potentially limits the ability of foreign corporations to strip earnings from related U.S.-based corporations by restricting the U.S. tax deduction for interest paid from a U.S.-based corporation to a related foreign corporation. Under existing rules, IRC §163(j) applies only when a U.S. group's debt-to-equity ratio exceeds 1.5. Short-term debt (such as accounts payable) is not considered debt for purposes of this debt-to-equity ratio (Reg.
§1.163(g)-(b)(2)(i)). For U.S.-based groups with debt-to-equity ratios in excess of 1.5, §163(j) disallows a current period tax deduction for related-party interest expense to the extent the U.S.-based group's total interest expense (net of interest income) exceeds 50 percent of the group's adjusted taxable income (i.e., taxable income before interest expense, depreciation, amortization, and depletion). Disallowed interest expense can be carried forward and utilized in future periods. Based on the 2002 and 2003 consolidating balance sheets, it appears that Section 163(j) would not apply to Ingersoll-Rand, Nabors, and Noble, because their U.S.-group debt-to-equity ratios are likely below 1.5. In the case of Cooper, it is possible that §163(j) limits the deductibility of U.S.-based entities' interest expense. Assuming that all of Cooper's U.S.-based operations are included under the heading "Cooper Ohio" in the fi rm's consolidating schedules, the computed debt-to-equity ratio exceeds four. However, it seems likely that a number of U.S.-based corporations are actually included in the consolidating schedules under "Other Subsidiaries," which have a debt-to-equity ratio less than 0.30 (when Cooper Ohio and Other Subsidiaries are combined, the debt-to-equity ratio is less than 0.90).
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In reaching conclusions regarding the earnings stripping behavior of these four 21 If we restrict the stripping-adjusted ETR to be no greater than the fi rm's pre-inversion period ETR, then the estimated stripping-related U.S. tax savings for Cooper and Nabors become $80.5 million and $117.5 million, respectively (the other two fi rms' estimates are not affected). With these changes, the percentage increase in net income from stripping for Cooper, Nabors, and the Total column become 19.75, 59.90, and 25.40 percent. 22 Several proposals to modify §163(j) have been considered or are presently under consideration. H.R. 2896 and U.S. Treasury proposals would reduce or eliminate the 1.5 debt-to-equity ratio safe harbor, and reduce the 50 percent of adjusted taxable income allowance. Other provisions would limit interest deductions when a U.S.-based group is more highly leveraged than the corporation's non-U.S.-based operations. A Senate proposal (S.1637) also provides increased restrictions on earnings stripping. However, unlike the House bill, S.1637 applies only to inverted fi rms. S.1637 also contains anti-inversion provisions retroactive to March 20, 2002 . For summaries of anti-stripping proposals, see Hufbauer and Assa (2003) , International Economics Policy Briefs (PB03-07), or Gravelle (2004) .
inverted fi rms, we acknowledge that our calculations may be subject to considerable noise, and that we use financial statement disclosures as mere proxies for the actual data reported on these four firms' tax returns. Nevertheless, based on our analysis, we conclude that substantial portions of the ETR reductions and post-inversion earnings reported by these four fi rms are the result of stripping U.S. earnings to lower-tax jurisdictions.
ALTERNATIVE EVIDENCE ON THE MARKET REACTION TO INVERSION
Our finding that inversion produces substantial fi nancial benefi ts is somewhat inconsistent with the mixed evidence reported in prior research on the valuation consequences of inversion. Desai and Hines (2002) examine the market reaction to boards of directors approving inversion transactions and report little evidence that, on average, the market views corporate inversion as a value-added choice. However, the study reports some evidence that cross-sectional variation in price reactions to board approval is explained by variables (e.g., leverage) proxying for potential inversion-related tax savings. Seida and Wempe (2002) and Cloyd et al. (2003b) fi nd no evidence of a positive market reaction to boards of directors approving inversion transactions. However, Seida and Wempe (2002) report results suggesting that the market reacts favorably to subsequent shareholder approval of inversion.
We utilize the full sample of 36 fi rms to examine the association between pre-to post-inversion changes in ETRs and abnormal returns earned at the times of board and shareholder approval of inversion. That is, unlike prior research that uses ex ante proxies for inversion benefi ts, we use the ex post ΔETR variable (i.e., post-inversion ETR minus pre-inversion ETR) to represent investors' expectations regarding future inversion-related tax benefi ts. The regression model is: To the extent that investors anticipate the tax benefi ts captured by ΔETR, we expect β 2 to be negative and β 3 to be positive (note that negative ΔETR values indicate tax rate reductions). Consistent with Seida and Wempe (2002) , we anticipate that inversion's positive valuation effects dissipate for inversions approved after Autumn 2001. A positive β 4 (indicating greater abnormal returns for pre-Autumn 2001 inversions) and a negative β 5 (indicating that the time trend differs for inversion and control fi rms) would support this predic- 23 The index is the return on the S&P 500, and days -260 through -11 are used as the estimation period.
tion. Following Desai and Hines (2002) , we include in [1] the one-year percentage price change in a fi rm's stock (PRICECHG) as an indirect measure of inversion benefi ts. If a fi rm with a substantially appreciated stock price elects to invert (which typically subjects shareholders to capital gains tax), it follows that the fi rm believes the present value of future inversion-related benefi ts dominates the tax cost borne by current shareholders at the transaction date. Hence, we expect that β 6 will be positive, and that β 7 will be negative.
In estimating [1] using board approval abnormal returns, we fi nd no evidence of associations between abnormal returns and any of the independent variables (the model's Adjusted R 2 is negative). Therefore, we present results related to the model examining shareholder approval abnormal returns only. Table 6 , Panel A, provides full and split-sample descriptive statistics for the variables included in [1] . With no distinction drawn between pre-and post-Autumn 2001 inversions, the between-sample difference in shareholder approval abnormal returns, although positive, is insignifi cant (p = .233). Aside from CONTROL, which differs between samples by design, only ΔETR differs between samples (p = .044, as in Table 2 ).
As indicated in Table 6 , Panel B, the model explains a substantial portion of the cross-sectional variation in shareholder approval abnormal returns (Adjusted R 2 of 46 percent). The coeffi cient estimates for inversion fi rms (i.e., β 2 , β 4 , and β 6 ) are signifi cant in the predicted directions at the 0.005, 0.001, and 0.003 levels, respec- Note: n = 36 (12 inversion fi rms and 24 matched control fi rms). ABNORMAL is the three-day abnormal return at the shareholder approval date. CONTROL is a binary variable coded one if the fi rm is a control fi rm; 0 if the fi rm inverted. ΔETR is the post-inversion effective tax rate minus the pre-inversion effective tax rate. EARLY is a binary variable coded one if shareholder inversion approval pre-dates Autumn 2001, 0 otherwise. PRICECHG is the percentage price change for the company's stock over the 252 trading days preceding shareholder approval. In Panel A, p-values are from two-sample t-tests (one-tailed for ABNORMAL and ΔETR; two-tailed for CONTROL, EARLY, and PRICECHG). In Panel B, p-values for all parameter estimates other than β 0 and β 1 are from one-tailed tests.
tively. 24 Likewise, benchmarking inversion fi rms to control fi rms yields results (for β 3 , β 5 , and β 7 ) that are signifi cant at the 0.012, 0.012, and 0.001 levels, respectively. For each of the constructs (i.e., ΔETR, EARLY, and PRICECHG) in [1], the results indicate a highly signifi cant correlation with ABNORMAL for inversion firms, but no correlation for control fi rms (in joint coeffi cient tests, the main coeffi cients for control fi rms are not signifi cant for any of the three constructs). In summary, the results in Table 6 indicate that the market appears to incorporate anticipated inversion benefi ts into share prices.
The results reported in Table 6 are subject to two caveats. First, Cloyd et al. (2003a) suggest that little justifi cation exists for positing a market reaction to shareholder approval of inversion, since shareholders generally overwhelmingly approve inversion transactions (of the inversions examined in Cloyd et al. (2003a) , 12 of the 13 that disclosed actual voting results were approved by more than 80 percent of shares voted). The inability of research to detect a signifi cant market reaction to board approval of inversion, yet document a significant reaction to subsequent shareholder approval, is perplexing. 25 However, prior research has produced similar results. Heron and Lewellen (1998) examine 294 U.S. fi rms that announced state domicile changes, and consider whether the price reaction to such changes is consistent with the management self-interest (i.e., takeover defense) and/or contractual efficiency (i.e., liability limits) hypotheses. The authors report little evidence of a signifi cant market reaction to initial reincorporation announcements, but fi nd evidence of a signifi cant market reaction to subsequent shareholder approval of such moves. Heron and Lewellen (1998) note that information regarding the impact of reincorporation may be conveyed at shareholder meetings, and that prior to shareholder approval, uncertainty regarding vote outcomes may exist (despite the fact that in the sample examined, all 294 proposed reincorporations were subsequently approved by shareholders). Cloyd et al. (2003a) note that three of the shareholder approval abnormal returns related to fi rms included in the sample are unusually large and possibly confounded, because: (i) Foster Wheeler (21.3 percent abnormal return) announced earnings and declared a dividend on its shareholder approval date; (ii) Tyco International (5.0 percent abnormal return) 24 We considered the economic signifi cance (or reasonableness) of the coeffi cient on ΔETR. The coeffi cient on ΔETR (-0.368) multiplied by mean ΔETR in the inversion sample (-0.116) is 4.3 percent. The 4.3 percent might be viewed as that portion of a typical inversion fi rm's total abnormal return that relates exclusively to inversion-related tax benefi ts (derived either from the elimination of U.S. tax on foreign earnings or from income stripping, both of which would affect ΔETR). For the 12 inversion fi rms included in the analysis, mean market value of equity is $3.231 billion. Therefore, the tax-savings-related increase in market value for the typical inverting fi rm is $139 million (i.e., $3.231 billion x 4.3 percent), or roughly $25 million of annual tax savings discounted at 12 percent for 10 years. 25 Cloyd et al. (2003b) provide three potential explanations for the market's apparent non-reaction to board approval of inversion: (i) news of inversions leaks prior to board approval, (ii) any future corporate tax savings are offset by other costs, and (iii) substantial uncertainty exists regarding shareholder approval of inversion. Cloyd et al. (2003b) examine returns prior to board approval announcements, but fi nd no evidence consistent with news of inversions being leaked. Another explanation is that uncertainty exists with regard to the extent of the inversion-related benefi ts. From additional analyses (results not tabulated), we fi nd that analysts' quarterly earnings forecast errors for inversion fi rms increase in post-inversion quarters, both absolutely and relative to control fi rms' forecast errors. (i.e., analysts underestimate inversion fi rms' post-inversion after-tax earnings). One interpretation of this fi nding is that analysts, and perhaps the market at large, have diffi culty estimating the fi nancial impact of inversion. An alternative interpretation of this fi nding is that managers of inversion fi rms defer pre-inversion income into lower-tax post-inversion periods.
inverted in a merger-related transaction; and (iii) Triton Energy (19.9 percent abnormal return) announced a major oil strike on the day following its inversion approval. With the possible exception of Triton's abnormal return, we believe these fi rms' abnormal returns are reasonable estimates of the inversion announcement reactions. Regarding Foster Wheeler, the earnings announcement met the forecast, and the dividend announced was merely a continuing dividend. In the case of Tyco International, we have no priors regarding any reaction to the merger component of the company's inversion. In addition, Seida and Wempe (2003) provide evidence that Tyco's abnormal return at inversion approval far exceeded its abnormal returns around the times of other of its (non-inversion) mergers. Although some ambiguity exists regarding the newsworthiness of Triton's oil strike (Seida and Wempe, 2003) , the business press generally attributed the spike in the company's stock price to the oil strike, rather than to its inversion approval. Given the ambiguity regarding Triton's abnormal return, we deleted the company (and its control fi rms) from the sample and re-estimated [1]. All regression variables remain significant at p < 0.05 or better. Hence, while the results reported in Table 6 remain subject to general concerns related to the small sample, our inferences are not sensitive to the retention of Triton in the sample.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the analyses and results described in this study, we reach three primary conclusions regarding corporate inversion. First, inversion allows fi rms to substantially reduce their effective tax rates. We fi nd that a typical inversion fi rm experiences an 11.6 percentage point reduction in its effective tax rate, or roughly a one-third reduction in its pre-inversion total income tax burden. Second, despite managers' claims that inversion is necessary to avoid U.S. tax on foreign earnings, most of the observed inversion-related tax reduction is likely due to avoidance of U.S. tax on U.S. earnings through increased stripping of U.S. earnings to lower-tax foreign countries. Specifi cally, we fi nd that inverted fi rms report dramatic increases in the percentages of their total pre-tax income derived from foreign sources, and we rule out underlying trends in "real" domestic and foreign profi tability as the predominant source of the increase. Consistent with concerns expressed by the Treasury Department, we conclude from a detailed analysis of four inversion fi rms that a large portion of the reduction (increase) in post-inversion ETRs (foreign pre-tax income shares) is attributable to the stripping of U.S. earnings via intercompany interest payments. Third, inversion-related tax savings are, to some extent, refl ected in market prices. We examine the association between inversion 26 We examined the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of the other fi rms identifi ed by Cloyd et al. (2003a) as having potentially confounded abnormal returns. We fi rst separately removed Foster Wheeler and Tyco (along with their control fi rms) from the full sample and re-estimated [1]. With either fi rm removed, all coeffi cients were signifi cant at p < 0.05. Next, we removed each of the three possible pairings of Triton Energy, Foster Wheeler, and Tyco (along with match fi rms) and re-estimated [1] . With Triton Energy and Foster Wheeler removed, the signifi cance of the ΔETR*CONTROL interaction declined to p = 0.150, and all other coeffi cients remained signifi cant at p < 0.10. With Triton Energy and Tyco or Foster Wheeler and Tyco removed, all coeffi cients were signifi cant at p < 0.05. Finally, we removed all three inversion fi rms and their associated matches (i.e., 25 percent of the sample). The signifi cance of the EARLY*CONTROL (ΔETR*CONTROL) coeffi cient deteriorated to p = 0.194 (p = 0.106), DPRC and its related interaction were insignifi cant, and remaining coeffi cients were signifi cant at p < 0.10 or better. Hence, if no portion of the abnormal returns earned by Triton Energy, Foster Wheeler, and Tyco upon shareholder approval of their inversions was actually inversion-related (despite their consistency with our model's predictions), then several of the inferences we draw from our primary results should be interpreted with caution.
fi rms' realized effective tax rate changes and the abnormal returns they earn at the times of board and shareholder approval of their inversions, and fi nd evidence that the shareholder approval price reaction is strongly associated with realized effective tax rate changes. Despite its uniqueness, an inversion transaction effectively transforms a U.S.-based multinational firm into an FCDC. Therefore, our study contributes to prior research examining FCDCs' tax planning strategies. Although numerous studies (e.g., Grubert et al. (1993) , Grubert (1999) , Kinney and Lawrence (2000) ) 27 suggest that FCDCs pay relatively less tax than U.S.-controlled domestic corporations, prior research has been unable to attribute the difference to intercompany income shifting (e.g., Collins et al. (1997) , Kinney and Lawrence (2000) ). Mills and Newberry (2004) do not explicitly examine intercompany transactions, but report evidence that FCDCs with parent companies subject to low foreign tax rates employ more debt in their capital structures. Therefore, our evidence suggesting that inverted fi rms use intercompany debt to strip U.S. earnings and reduce their tax burdens is generally consistent with Mills and Newberry's (2004) conclusions, which were based on an analysis of a broader sample of FCDCs.
Policymakers grappling with the corporate inversion issue face diffi cult challenges. First, to the extent U.S. policies related to taxation of foreign earnings create competitive disadvantages for U.S.-domiciled fi rms, appropriate tax relief is warranted. However, the development of new impediments to the earnings stripping behavior documented in this study is equally important. Based on the results of our analysis, we conclude that inverted fi rms' (presumed) technical compliance with current, rule-based impediments to earnings stripping is producing U.S. tax outcomes (i.e., liabilities) that bear very little resemblance to underlying economic events and circumstances. In other words, it seems implausible that the earnings stripping behavior we document is consistent with the notion that a fair tax system must favor substance over form, and that the tax treatments of income and expense items should produce a result that clearly refl ects an entity's income. However, any anti-stripping legislation that applies to all foreign multinationals, rather than just inverted fi rms, would surely invite retaliatory tax law changes by other countries (Hufbauer and Assa, 2003) . But any legislation applying only to inversions, such as that contained in the Jumpstart Our Business Strength bill (S.1637), would afford (non-inverted) foreign fi rms an ability to strip U.S. earnings that could not be duplicated by an inverted fi rm. This policy puzzle is diffi cult to solve without underlying tax reform. The appropriate policy response may depend in part on obtaining explicit evidence on the extent to which non-inversion FCDCs avoid U.S. tax on U.S. earnings through intercompany interest payments or other intercompany transactions. sity, Texas A&M University, Texas Christian University, University of North Texas, University of Notre Dame, and Texas Tech University. We gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of T. J. Curran and Brooke Anderson. We thank I/B/E/S International Inc. for providing earnings per share forecast data, available through the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System. These data are provided as part of a broad academic program to encourage earnings expectation research.
